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Abstract The article analyzes how crimmigration law, combined with a range of
illegal practices employed by the Tunisian authorities, negatively impacts on the
human rights of irregular migrants, in particular asylum seekers, in Tunisia. By
placing Tunisia’s migration policy within the broader EU strategy of externalizing
migration controls, the article shows how the EU supports, and relies on, Tunisia’s
systemic violations of human rights in order to prevent irregular migrants from
reaching the EU.The central part of the article is divided in four sections, with each
section examining the impact of Tunisia’s migration policy on a specific human right.
The first section analyzes how legislation criminalizing irregular migration and
migration-related activities, together with illegal practices used by Tunisian security
forces (e.g., pushing back irregular migrants at Tunisian borders, detaining irregular
migrants in order to prevent them from making asylum claims), deprive irregular
migrants of their right to seek asylum. The second section examines how practices
adopted by Tunisian security forces (e.g., refusing to allow irregular migrants to have
access to lawyers and interpreters) undermine the right to due process in both
criminal proceedings and proceedings for protection status determination. The third
section argues that measures adopted by the Tunisian authorities (e.g., preventing
refugees with protection status from obtaining residency permits) violate the refu-
gees’ right to work, while the fourth section analyzes how the criminalization of
irregular departure from Tunisia violates the right to leave a country, including one’s
own country.
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Introduction: the Politics of Prevention
The externalization of migration controls to third countries is one of the central pillars
of the European Union’s (EU) migration policy (EC 2015). Since the late 1990s, the
EU has sought to outsource Bmigration management^ to third countries in order to
prevent irregular migrants, including asylum seekers, from reaching EU territory
(Boswell 2003; Casas et al. 2011). By supporting measures aimed at stopping EU-
bound irregular migrants in transit countries in North Africa and the Middle East, EU
member states wanted to avoid any legal obligations towards potential asylum seekers
(Casas-Cortes et al. 2016; Mitsilegas 2015; MSF 2015).1 One of the North African
countries the EU included into its plan to create an effective pre-frontier Bbuffer zone^
against irregular migration was Tunisia, historically a transit country for irregular
migrants trying to reach the EU from other parts of Africa, a sending country of
Tunisian citizens seeking better livelihoods in the EU (Boubakri and Mazzella 2005;
Natter 2015; Romdhani 2016), and, more recently, a destination country for migrants,
mostly Libyans, fleeing from conflict zones (IOM 2014).
The agreements on migration signed by Tunisia and the EU, and the bilateral
agreements between Tunisia and several European countries, including Italy, France,
Germany, and Switzerland (GDP 2014; Mazzoleni 2016), reveal that EU member states
outsourced, or they still seek to outsource, to Tunisia the following Bmigration
management^ operations. First, one of the key objectives pursued by the EU is to
use the Tunisian security forces to prevent irregular migration from Tunisia to the EU
by stopping Bboat people^ trying to reach Italian shores from Tunisian territory
(Frontex 2013). In addition, EU member states, in particular Italy, want the Tunisian
security forces to intercept at sea boats with irregular migrants who embark on their
journey towards the EU from Libyan territory. The EU expects Tunisia to take in
intercepted irregular migrants from Libya and process their asylum claims on Tunisian
territory (Traynor 2015, GDP 2015). In early 2017, Italy, backed by the EU, was close
1 Besides the EU, the USA and Australia are the primary destination countries that have externalized their
border controls in order to prevent irregular migrants, including asylum seekers, from reaching their territories
(Frelick et al. 2016). The USA, for example, started to externalize migration controls under the Reagan
administration, with an agreement between the USA and Haiti that authorized the USA to interdict and detain
Bboat people^ from Haiti before returning them back to Haiti (ibid.). The USA also externalized migration
controls to Mexico and Central American countries in order to secure their assistance in reducing the flow of
irregular migrants into the USA (Jones and Roney 1989). Australia’s efforts to externalize border controls go
back to 2001 when the Australian navy began intercepting Bboat people^ on the high seas and forcibly
returning them to Indonesia or the Pacific island states of Nauru or Papua New Guinea (Magner 2004; HRW
2002). The returns to Indonesia were carried out despite the fact that Australia and Indonesia had no agreement
to guarantee the protection of intercepted refugees from refoulement (HRW 2002). Australia’s migration-
control externalization policy, called the BPacific Solution,^ was later expanded to Sri Lanka and Malaysia
(Frelick et al. 2016). In late 2014, the Australian parliament passed legislation that gave the government the
power to detain Bboat people^ and transfer them to any country chosen by the minister of immigration and
border protection (KCIRL 2014). Given that the designation of a third country to serve as an offshore
processing country did not need to be determined by reference to the international obligations or domestic
law of that country, it seemed that the Australian government wanted to have the power to return irregular
migrants even to third countries where their rights could be at risk (ibid). By externalizing their border controls
to third countries, both the USA and Australia started to return irregular migrants, including asylum seekers, to
countries where migrants had no guarantees that their basic human rights would be respected (e.g., the right to
seek and enjoy asylum, the right to liberty, the right to remedy…) (AI 2017, Frelick et al. 2016).
86 Badalič V.
to sign an agreement with Tunisia to take in 200 intercepted Bboat people^ from Libya
per month (Fubini 2017).
Second, the EU would like to see Tunisia cooperate, via Frontex, in the collection
and sharing of intelligence on migration flows from Tunisia to EU territory. Although
the EU included Tunisia, in 2013, into the Seahorse Mediterranean Network, a program
aimed at establishing a communication network to exchange information on irregular
migration between North African countries (e.g., Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria)
and EU countries, EU officials still had to persuade Tunisia, in early 2017, to actively
participate in the program (EMHRN 2013; EC 2017b).
Third, the EU put pressure on Tunisia to enact legislation criminalizing migration-
related activities (e.g., smuggling of migrants and human trafficking) in order to limit
the assistance provided to irregular migrants passing through Tunisian territory towards
the EU (Cassarino 2014).
Fourth, EU member states exerted pressure on Tunisia to accept the return of
Tunisian citizens who irregularly migrated to the EU and third country citizens who
reached the EU by irregularly transiting through Tunisia. A number of EU countries,
for example Italy, France, and Switzerland, have signed with Tunisia bilateral agree-
ments on readmission (Mazzoleni 2016). In addition, Tunisia signed with the EU, in
early 2014, the Mobility Partnership Agreement, a framework for cooperation on
migration that included a provision on readmission (UGTT et al. 2014).
The EU was able to impose the externalization of migration controls on Tunisia by
linking effective Bmigration management^ to the substantial financial assistance pro-
vided by the EU to Tunisia. Being Tunisia’s most generous provider of aid and its most
important trading partner gave the EU considerable leverage in the process of defining
key aspects of Tunisia’s fight against irregular migration (Mazzoleni 2016). On the one
hand, the EU provided financial assistance for the political, economic, and social
development of Tunisia. This kind of support became particularly important for Tunisia
after the toppling of the Ben Ali regime in 2011 when the country entered into a period
of prolonged political instability and deteriorating economic conditions. In the post-
revolutionary period, from 2011 to 2016, EU assistance to Tunisia amounted to about €
2 billion in total, which was used to support the transition to a democratic system and
achieve the country’s fiscal stability (EC 2016). In addition, European financial insti-
tutions have granted loans worth € 2.6 billion for infrastructure, private sector devel-
opment, and water sanitation projects in Tunisia (ibid.). Taking advantage of Tunisia’s
vulnerable position, the EU used its financial support for the democratic transition as
leverage in the process of convincing the Tunisian authorities to sign the Mobility
Partnership Agreement, a declaration that defined the general objectives of a common
Bmigration management^ strategy. During the pre-revolutionary years, the Ben Ali
regime was able to avoid signing such an agreement, but the fragile post-revolutionary
political elite needed the backing of the EU and thus had little choice but to accept the
EU strategy on preventing irregular migration (Limam and Del Sarto 2015; Eyster and
Paoletti 2016).
On the other hand, EU member states also used visa facilitation programs for
Tunisian citizens seeking work in the EU as an incentive to convince the Tunisian
authorities to adopt EU-friendly migration measures, in particular the readmission of
irregular migrants who reached the EU from/through Tunisia. In 1998, for example,
Italy and Tunisia signed a readmission agreement after Italy agreed to allocate an
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annual quota of 3000 work visas for Tunisian citizens (Natter 2015). In 2008, France
reached a similar agreement with Tunisia, promising work permits for 9000 Tunisian
citizens per year in return for cooperation on readmission and the prevention of
irregular migration (ibid.). Over the following years, the tactic of linking readmission
programs to visa facilitation programs became part of EU policy (EC 2016; Reslow
2015).
In addition to the financial assistance for economic and social development, Tunisia
received from the EU funding for improving its Bmigration management^ operations,
in particular funding for strengthening control on its borders. First, EU member states
provided Tunisia with the equipment needed to control its land and sea borders. In
2011, for example, Italy agreed to donate to Tunisia patrol boats and a hundred off-road
vehicles for the fight against irregular migration to Italy (Tazzioli 2011). In late 2012
and early 2013, Italy handed over to Tunisia three patrol boats (Frontex 2013). Second,
EU member states granted to Tunisia funding to build the infrastructure needed for
enhancing migration control. In 1998, for example, Italy agreed to provide financial
assistance for the creation of migration detention centers in Tunisia (Vassalo Paleologo
2009). And third, the EU provided funding for capacity building support in the area of
border control (EC 2017a).
The kind of migration-related funding provided by the EU to Tunisia indicated that
the EU’s central objective was to prevent irregular migration to the EU and not to
improve mechanisms for protecting the rights of irregular migrants, including asylum
seekers (Planes-Boissac et al. 2010). In part, the EU justified its position by claiming
that irregular migration represented a potential security risk. This view was, to a large
extent, based on the assumption that irregular migrants represented a potential terrorist
threat (Frontex 2016; Frontex 2017). In addition, the EU justified its fight against
irregular migration by claiming it was a humanitarian effort that aimed at saving
people’s lives by dismantling the criminal groups involved in the smuggling and
trafficking of irregular migrants (EC 2016). These two EU narratives on irregular
migration were largely shared by both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Tuni-
sian governments. In the pre-revolutionary period, the Tunisian authorities portrayed
irregular migrants as a security threat for the country and used it as a pretext to refuse to
consider protection requests from asylum seekers (Planes-Boissac et al. 2012; Laacher
2007). In post-revolutionary Tunisia, the idea that irregular migrants represented a
potential terrorist threat gained momentum after the escalation of war in Libya, with
irregular migration seen as a way for terrorist groups to infiltrate Tunisia (Driss 2016).
In both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Tunisia, successive governments also
adopted the view that the fight against irregular migration was a fight against criminal
groups involved in people smuggling. After the Ben Ali regime enacted, in 2004,
legislation criminalizing the smuggling of irregular migrants, the fight against human
smuggling became part of Tunisia’s migration policy (Loi Organique 2004).
With the prevention of irregular migration promoted as a fight against terrorism
and crime, it seemed almost inevitable that Tunisia embraced crimmigration law as
a means to tackle irregular migration. Crimmigration law, the convergence of
criminal law and migration law (Stumpf 2006), strengthens the perception of
migrants as criminal offenders and, consequently, creates the impression that they
represent a permanent security risk (García Hernández 2014), both of which can be
useful for policy makers trying to portray irregular migration as a potential security
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threat.2 In Tunisia, both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary governments used
laws criminalizing irregular migration and migration-related activities as one of the
key tools for enhancing migration controls. Such approach fell neatly into the EU
anti-migration strategy that viewed the criminalization of irregular migration as one
of the cornerstones of the fight against irregular migration both within and beyond
EU borders (Mitsilegas 2013; Mitsilegas 2015; Crépeau 2013b).
The main objective of this article is to analyze how crimmigration law, combined
with a range of illegal practices employed by the Tunisian authorities, negatively
impact on the human rights of irregular migrants, in particular asylum seekers, in
Tunisia. The central part of the article is divided in four sections, with each section
examining the impact of Tunisia’s migration policy on a specific human right. The first
section analyzes how legislation criminalizing irregular migration and migration-related
activities, together with illegal practices used by Tunisian security forces (e.g., pushing
back irregular migrants at Tunisian borders, detaining irregular migrants in order to
prevent them from making asylum claims), deprive irregular migrants of their right to
seek asylum. The second section examines how illegal practices adopted by Tunisian
security forces (e.g., refusing to allow irregular migrants to have access to lawyers and
interpreters) undermine the right to due process in both criminal proceedings and
proceedings for protection status determinations. The third section argues that measures
adopted by the Tunisian authorities (e.g., preventing refugees with protection status
from obtaining residency permits) violate the refugees’ right to work, while the fourth
section analyzes how the criminalization of irregular exit from Tunisia violates the right
to leave a country, including one’s own.
By placing Tunisia’s migration policy and practices within the broader EU strategy
of externalizing migration controls, the article will show how the EU supports, and
relies on, Tunisia’s systemic violations of human rights in order to prevent irregular
migrants from reaching the EU.
Denying the Right to Seek Asylum
After the fall of the Ben Ali regime in early 2011, Tunisia included the right to seek
asylum in its new constitution. Article 26 of the post-revolutionary constitution,
promulgated on 27 January 2014, states that the right to political asylum shall be
guaranteed as prescribed by law. In the first years of the revolutionary process,
triggered by the desire to create a democratic and human right- based system in the
country, it seemed that the new political elite was serious about guaranteeing irregular
migrants the right to seek asylum, a fundamental human right originally enshrined in
the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights (UDHR) and reaffirmed in numerous UN
General Assembly Resolutions (UN General Assembly 1948; IMBR 2013). That hope,
2 The term Bcrimmigration law,^ coined by Stumpf (2006), denotes the merger between criminal law and
migration law that took place in the following areas: the substance of criminal law and migration law started to
overlap (e.g., proliferation of grounds for excluding/deporting non-citizens convicted of crimes, actions by
migrants that were previously civil violations became criminal offenses, focus on detaining and deporting non-
citizens likely to represent a threat to national security), the enforcement of migration law became similar to
the enforcement of criminal law, and the procedural aspects of prosecuting migration-related violations started
to resemble aspects of criminal procedure (Stump 2006; García Hernández 2014; García Hernández 2015).
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however, soon dissipated. Despite being bound by international law and its new
constitution, post-revolutionary Tunisian governments refused to assume their obliga-
tion to enact legislation on asylum and thus failed to establish specific administrative
measures for fair and efficient status determination procedures. With the issue of
protection for asylum seekers still being a low priority for Tunisian policy makers,
Tunisia remains without an asylum law (Garelli and Tazzioli 2017).
Although both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary governments consistently
refused to enact legislation for establishing protection status determination mecha-
nisms, they did allow the UNHCR to take over the process of adjudicating asylum
claims (Planes-Boissac et al. 2010; US Department of State 2017). In 1992, the
UNHCR signed its first agreement with Tunisia to become the sole authority respon-
sible for determining refugee status (Planes-Boissac et al. 2012). After the revolution, in
September 2011, the UNHCR and the Tunisian government signed a new agreement
reaffirming UNHCR’s role in protection status determination procedures (ibid.). Even
though irregular migration is treated as a criminal offense, the law provides for
exceptions for situations covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention, thus ensuring, at
least on paper, that irregular migrants have the right to apply for protection status at the
UNHCR office in Tunis (Loi Organique 1975).
Despite the agreement with the UNHCR, the Tunisian authorities, both pre-
revolutionary and post-revolutionary, created many obstacles that prevented irregu-
lar migrants from lodging asylum claims, thus depriving them of their right to seek
asylum. The overall strategy of stopping irregular migrants in their attempts to make
asylum claims consisted of two tactics. The first tactic, which included Bpush-backs^
at the borders and detentions, was to prevent asylum seekers from reaching the
UNHCR office, while the second tactic aimed at limiting the work of individuals
and organizations that assisted asylums seekers in procedures for protection status
determination.
Preventing Asylum Seekers from Reaching the UNHCR
First, the Tunisian security forces prevented asylum seekers from lodging asylum
claims by carrying out, from time to time, Bpush-backs^ of people fleeing from Algeria
and the conflict in Libya (Crépeau, 2013a). This tactic gained momentum after 2013
when the Tunisian government reached an agreement with Algeria and Libya to
enhance border control in order to stop irregular migration from both countries. The
agreement included major upgrades on cross-border security that aimed at cracking
down on the smuggling of migrants (DRC 2014).
Second, the Tunisian security forces prevented asylum seekers from reaching the
UNHCR by detaining them in migration detention centers and deporting them back
home. This tactic depended on the criminalization of irregular migration which was
first introduced in 1968. On 8 March 1968, the Tunisian government, led by President
Habib Bourguiba, passed the Organic Law 1968–7 that criminalized the irregular entry,
stay, and exit of the country. Article 23 of the Law 1968–7 provided for a penalty of
1 month to 1 year in prison and a fine of 6 to 120 Tunisian dinars [from 2.3 to 46 €] for
non-citizens who entered or exited Tunisia without proper documentation or overstayed
their temporary visa or residence permit (Loi Organique 1968). The Law 1968–7 also
introduced a harsh penalty—up to 3 years in prison—for foreign citizens who evaded
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deportation or who, after being expelled from Tunisia, returned to the country without
authorization (ibid.).
Treating unauthorized entry into the country as a criminal offense was the corner-
stone of Tunisia’s practice of preventing irregular migrants from making asylum claims
at the UNHCR. The criminalization of irregular migration, which enabled the Tunisian
security forces to keep in detention all irregular migrants, including asylum seekers,
paved the way for the introduction of the illegal practice of not allowing detained
irregular migrants to reach the UNHCR. Although the law guaranteed the right to apply
for asylum, detained irregular migrants were not able to exercise their right because
they were not allowed, after being arrested, to reach the sole authority responsible for
adjudicating asylum claims. On the one hand, the Tunisian security forces locked
irregular migrants in officially recognized migration detention facilities. In the pre-
revolutionary period, between 2005 and 2011, the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC), at the time the only international organization allowed to visit Tunisian
detention facilities, acknowledged it identified many foreign citizens imprisoned for
offenses encompassing violations of migration law (e.g., the irregular entry into the
country) (Planes-Boissac et al. 2012). The ICRC officials were not able to provide the
exact number of detained irregular migrants, but they argued there was a Bsignificant
degree of turnover^ of foreign citizens held for brief periods of time in detention
facilities Bspread across the country^ (ibid.). Those detained, among them potential
asylum seekers, had no access to the UNHCR.3 In post-revolutionary Tunisia, the local
authorities adopted a similar approach. Although they started to allow the UNHCR and
local human rights organizations to visit irregular migrants detained in prisons and the
two officially recognized migration detention centers, the so-called Breception and
orientation centers,^ the number of visits remained limited, which, consequently,
curtailed the access of detained asylum seekers to the UNHCR (GDP 2015;
Tringham 2016; Crépeau 2013a). The two migration detention centers were Wardia
Center, located on the southern fringes of Tunis, and the detention center in Ben
Guerdane, a city in the south of the country (GDP 2014; Tringham 2016). Although
the Tunisian National Guard allowed independent observers from local and interna-
tional organizations to visit Wardia, probably Tunisia’s largest detention center for
irregular migrants, the center remained many times inaccessible (Tringham 2016). In
addition, basic data about Wardia Center were not publicly available, for example, there
were no official figures on how many people were being detained and deported
(Tazzioli 2015).
On the other hand, the Tunisian security forces prevented irregular migrants from
applying for asylum by locking them in secret migration detention centers that were
completely off-limits for the UNHCR or any other organization. Although the Tunisian
authorities insisted they had only two detention centers for irregular migrants, research
evidence indicated there were between 10 to 13 detention centers in the country (UN
3 According to Planes-Boissac et al. (2012), in the pre-revolutionary years the Tunisian authorities also
prevented international organizations, including the UNHCR, from having access to parts of the country
where irregular migrants were located. Between 1992 and 2011, the UNHCRwas not allowed to travel outside
Tunis and visit other parts of the country to identify asylum seekers. In that period, the UNHCR received
asylum seekers only at the office of its operational partner, the Tunisian Red Crescent, in central Tunis. It was
in the post-revolutionary years that Tunisia started to allow the UNHCR and other international organization to
move freely across the country.
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Human Rights Council 2017; Mazzoleni 2016; Crépeau 2013; Benouaret 2009;
Benouaret 2010). In both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Tunisia, irregular
migrants held in secret detention centers whose exact locations remain unknown had no
chance to get access to legal aid and make an asylum claim. Deprived of their basic
rights, including the right to seek asylum, the detainees were either forced to pay for
their own deportation to their country of origin, or, if they did not have the funds to pay
for their flight back home, they were dumped by the Tunisian security forces in the
desert on the Tunisian-Algerian border (DRC 2014; GDP 2015).
Limiting Assistance for Asylum Seekers During Status Determination Procedures
Unlike the abovementioned two tactics that deprived irregular migrants of their right to
seek asylum by physically preventing them from getting in contact with the UNHCR,
the third tactic opted for a subtler approach. The third tactic, which was used in both the
pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, relied on the criminalization of
migration-related activities to limit any kind of assistance provided to asylum seekers.
By criminalizing migration-related activities, including the provision of humanitarian
aid, the Tunisian authorities put pressure on individuals and organizations offering
assistance to asylum seekers, thus making it more difficult for asylum seekers to be
successful in status determination procedures.
The first effort to criminalize migration-related activities was made in 1968 when the
Bourguiba regime passed Organic Law 1968–7. Article 25 of the 1968–7 law stipulated
that individuals who, directly or indirectly, knowingly helped or attempted to facilitate
the entry, exit, and stay of irregular migrants in the country shall face imprisonment from
1month to 1 year and a fine of between 6 and 120 Tunisian dinars [from 2.3 to 46 €] (Loi
Organique 1968). A key problem with that law was that it did not distinguish between
volunteers providing humanitarian aid to irregular migrants and people smugglers who
helped irregular migrants in order to obtain financial or other material benefit.
The second effort that introduced new criminal offenses and tougher sanctions for
migration-related activities occurred in 2004. In order to respond to the EU call for
establishing a legal framework for tackling the problem of people smuggling, the Ben
Ali regime passed, in early February 2004, the Law 2004–6 (Cassarino 2014). The law
was originally enacted to implement the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants
(2000), endorsed by the international community to intensify the fight against criminal
networks profiting from people smuggling. The Ben Ali regime, however, criminalized
not only human smuggling but also any form of assistance provided to irregular
migrants. The Law 2004–6, for example, criminalized the hosting and transporting of
irregular migrants on Tunisian territory. A penalty of 4 years in prison and a fine of
10,000 Tunisian dinars [about 3800 €] was introduced for Banyone who has sheltered
persons entering or exiting Tunisia illegally, […] or has provided them with accom-
modation [emphasis added]^ and B[a]nyone providing them with any type of transpor-
tation [emphasis added]^ (Loi Organique 2004). By refusing to distinguish between
people smugglers and humanitarian workers, the 2004–6 law criminalized any form of
assistance to irregular migrants, including the provision of humanitarian aid and
medical treatment (Ben Jemia and Ben Achour 2014).
Furthermore, the Law 2004–6 criminalized the non-denouncement of irregular
migrants and the individuals helping them. The law provided sentences of up to
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3 months in prison and a fine of 500 Tunisian dinars [about 190 €] for Banyone who,
even if covered by the obligation of professional secrecy, fails to immediately report to
the proper authorities information or activities that have come to his attention regarding
the performance of an offence [i.e. irregular migration] described in the present chapter
[emphasis added]^ (Loi Organique 2004). The failure to report knowledge on the
whereabouts of irregular migrants, and those who assisted them, thus became punish-
able. It was especially disturbing to see that the law expected even professionals bound
by professional secrecy (e.g., doctors, lawyers) to inform the authorities if they came in
contact with irregular migrants (Loi Organique 2004, Crépeau 2013a).
Both the criminalization of humanitarian assistance and the criminalization of non-
denouncement of irregular migrants and the people helping them negatively impacted
on irregular migrants seeking asylum. By penalizing all individuals who assisted
migrants irregularly staying in the country, the law posed a threat to the work of civil
society groups trying to help irregular migrants on their path towards asylum. The
criminalization of assistance to asylum seekers reduced their chances to receive any
kind of assistance as they attempted to obtain protection status (Planes-Boissac et al.
2010). In addition, by stipulating that humanitarian workers and other professionals
involved in assisting irregular migrants had to operate as spies for the authorities, the
2004–6 law severely undermined the trust between irregular migrants and humanitarian
workers. By creating an environment of mistrust, the law forced irregular migrants to
be more cautious when seeking help and thus indirectly reduced their access to the
services provided by humanitarian organizations (Ben Jemia and Ben Achour 2014).
As a result, the law negatively impacted on the chances of asylum seekers to be
successful in status determination procedures.
Denying the Right to Due Process
By externalizing its migration controls to Tunisia, the EU deprived irregular migrants,
including asylum seekers, of their right to a due process of law, a fundamental human
right recognized in several international legal instruments, including the UDHR and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (UN General Assembly
1948; UN General Assembly 1966a). All migrants, irregular and regular, have the right
to due process before the courts of law and all other authorities administering justice, as
well as the authority charged with making protection status determinations (IMBR
2013). The right to due process includes access to legal aid and representation, and to
an interpreter to interpret in a language amigrant can understand (ibid). Although Article
14 of the ICCPR expressly recognizes the right to legal assistance only in criminal cases,
the UN Human Rights Committee asserted that Article 14 applies to both criminal and
civil cases (UN Human Rights Committee 1984; IMBR 2013). Therefore, host states
should provide asylum seekers with access to legal assistance in protection status
determination procedures. In addition, all migrants have to be informed of their right
to have a lawyer and an interpreter immediately after becoming a party in criminal or any
other proceedings (IMBR 2013). If migrants cannot afford to pay for a lawyer and
interpreter, host countries have to provide them free of charge (ibid).
In both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Tunisia, the local authorities reg-
ularly denied irregular migrants the right to due process in both criminal proceedings
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and status determination proceedings. First, by refusing to provide access to legal aid
and representation, the Tunisian authorities denied the right to due process to irregular
migrants who applied for asylum at the UNHCR (Tringham 2016). When the Tunisian
security forces allowed detained irregular migrants to get in contact with the UNHCR
in order to apply for asylum, asylum claimants remained without access to legal
assistance prior and during the status determination process (ibid.). Asylum claimants
also did not have access to legal aid if they appealed the decision on asylum made by
the UNHCR (ibid.). In addition, in some cases, asylum claimants were not provided
with trained and qualified interpreters to help them during status determination proce-
dure (Roesch et al. 2014).
Second, irregular migrants were deprived of their right to due process during
criminal proceedings, usually by being denied access to a lawyer. The courts did not
appoint defense lawyers for irregular migrants who stood trial for unauthorized entry
into the country (Tringham 2016). In addition, many irregular migrants allegedly
involved in criminal offenses not encompassing violations of migration law were
detained by the security forces and denied access to a court of law (Crépeau 2013a).
After being arrested, they were held in pretrial detention for long periods of time, even
up to a year, without being charged (ibid.). While held in detention, migrant detainees
were refused the permission to see a lawyer, to get in contact with their family members
and their consular authorities (ibid.). It was only after they paid a fine that they were
released without charges and deported (ibid.).
Denying the Right to Work
All migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees, have the right to work, defined
not as an absolute right to obtain employment, but rather as a right to the opportunity to
gain a living by work that an individual freely chooses and accepts (UN General
Assembly 1966b). This right, a fundamental human right, entails a number of rights in
the workplace, including the right to just and favorable conditions of work (e.g.,
minimum working age, maximum working hours, safety and health standards, protec-
tion against discrimination, and unfair dismissal), the right to fair and equal remuner-
ation, and the right to form trade unions and engage in collective bargaining with
employers (UN General Assembly 1966b; IMBR 2013). With respect to labor condi-
tions and employment, host countries have to provide migrants a treatment as favorable
as that accorded to citizens by existing labor laws (IMBR 2013).
In both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Tunisia, the local authorities denied
many refugees with protection status the right to work by preventing them from getting
access to the formal labor market. Refugees could not enter the formal labor market
because the Tunisian authorities refused to issue them cartes de séjour, residency
permits, key documents that allowed all migrants to legally reside and work in Tunisia
(Tringham 2016, Planes-Boissac et al. 2012). After being granted protection status,
refugees had to obtain a residency permit at the police station closest to their place of
residence in order to legally stay and work in the country, but because the Tunisian
authorities refused to provide them with the permits, the refugees remained in a
precarious position (Tringham 2016). There is currently still no provision in Tunisian
laws recognizing refugee status, and, therefore, the laws governing foreign citizens—
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the Organic Laws passed in 1968, 1975, and 2004—are applied to refugees with
respect to residency. That means that refugees with protection status still have to obtain
a residency permit if they want to live and work legally in the country.
Before the 2011 revolution, access to residency permits was Bpurely a chance
occurrence^ for refugees with protection status—only about 40% of refugees received
a residency permit and were thus allowed to legally reside and work in Tunisia (Planes-
Boissac et al. 2012). After the revolution, the Tunisian authorities continued to refuse
granting residency cards to refugees (Tringham 2016). The refugees who were not
granted residency permits were treated by the Tunisian authorities as Bsemi-illegals^
who were not allowed to live and work in Tunisia and could even be deported (Planes-
Boissac et al. 2012).4 Only individuals with legal status—i.e., individuals with a
residency permit—had the right to access the formal labor market, while those without
a residency permit, including refugees with protection status, remained without the
right to work (ibid.).
Denying the Right to Leave One’s Own Country
Several international legal instruments, including the UDHR and the ICCPR, express
the right to leave any country, including one’s own (UN General Assembly 1948; UN
General Assembly 1966a; Harvey and Barnidge 2007). This right is not absolute as
state parties are allowed to impose, in specific circumstances, restrictions on the
movement of people trying to leave their country (Guild 2013, Markard 2016). When
states decide to limit the right to leave, they must demonstrate that the laws prohibiting
the exit from the country meet the test of legality and necessity, come under one of the
grounds listed in Article 12 (3) of the ICCPR, and are consistent with other provisions
of the ICCPR (UN Human Rights Committee 1999; Harvey and Barnidge 2007; Guild
2013; Gallagher and David 2014). According to Article 12 (3) of the ICCPR, the right
to leave a country can only be subjected to restrictions that are necessary to protect
national security, public order, public health or morals, and the rights and freedoms of
others (UN General Assembly 1966a; UN Human Rights Committee 1999).
The Tunisian authorities subjected the right to leave the country to a restriction that
was not justified within the terms of Article 12 (3). The restriction, introduced by the
Bourguiba regime in 1975, was the detention of Tunisian citizens who tried to
irregularly exit the country. The Organic Law 1975–40, which criminalized the irreg-
ular departure of Tunisian citizens, stated that if Tunisians irregularly exited the
country, they shall be punished, upon return, with a 15-day to 6-month prison sentence
and/or a fine of 30 to 120 Tunisian dinars [from 11 to 46 €] (Loi Organique 1975). That
law was also embraced by the post-revolutionary political elite. Despite including in the
new Tunisian constitution, under Article 24, a provision stating that every citizen has
the right to leave the country, the post-revolutionary political elite refused to repeal the
law that criminalizes the irregular exit of Tunisian citizens. Although the 1975–40 law
clearly contravenes the new constitution, it remains in place.
4 Before the 2011 revolution, there were even a few cases of deportations of refugees with residency permits.
In some cases, whole families were deported, for example, an Ivoirian couple with a 2-month-old infant
(Planes-Boissac et al. 2012).
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By embracing the criminalization of irregular departure from the country, both pre-
revolutionary and post-revolutionary political elites violated the right—a fundamental
human right—of their citizens to leave the country (Crépeau 2013a). The only differ-
ence between the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary period was that the post-
revolutionary authorities less systematically prosecuted the criminal offense of irregu-
larly leaving one’s own country. Before and during the 2011 revolution, many
Tunisians citizens were held in detention centers after being arrested for irregularly
migrating from the country, but after the revolution, the number of detainees dropped
(ibid.). In the post-revolutionary period, the security forces usually detained for only a
few days Tunisians intercepted while fleeing the country. After paying a small fine, the
detainees were released (ibid.).
Conclusion: the Externalization of the Fight Against Human Rights
The similarities between Tunisia’s pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary migration
policies and practices indicate that the fight against irregular migration is, in effect, a
fight against human rights that transcends the dichotomy between an authoritarian
regime and a democratic system. Although the post-revolutionary authorities intro-
duced a few minor improvements in Bmanaging^ irregular migration (e.g., improving
access for UNHCR officials to migration detention centers, decreasing the number of
Tunisians imprisoned for irregularly leaving their country), they, to a large extent,
adopted the migration policy of the pre-revolutionary period. Despite the transition into
a democratic system that was supposed to be based on human rights, the post-
revolutionary political elite retained all laws enacted by the ancien régime to criminal-
ize irregular migration and migration-related activities. The post-revolutionary author-
ities also adopted the illegal practices used by the pre-revolutionary regime to thwart
the in/outflow of irregular migrants (e.g., pushing back irregular migrants at the
borders, preventing detained irregular migrants from reaching the UNHCR, and deny-
ing irregular migrants the right to due process).5
In both the pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary period, the Tunisian authorities
pursued three key objectives: first, to stop cross-border movements in order to prevent
irregular migrants, including asylum seekers, from reaching the EU; second, deny
irregular migrants the right to seek asylum in Tunisia; and third, deny refugees with
protection status the right to live and work in Tunisia. All three objectives were part of a
strategy that aimed to prevent irregular migrants to seek and enjoy asylum in either
Tunisia or the EU.
In both pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary Tunisia, the EU tacitly supported,
and relied on, the local authorities in the fight against human rights of irregular
migrants. Although EU member states many times stressed their commitment to protect
5 Due to the secrecy surrounding the Tunisian fight against irregular migration, it is not possible to provide an
estimate about how many migrants became victims of human rights violations. In both the pre-revolutionary
and post-revolutionary period, there were no exact data about how many people had been detained and
deported from Tunisia without being given the opportunity to reach the UNHCR for lodging an asylum claim
(Planes-Boissac et al. 2012; Tazzioli 2015). There is also no data about how many people were pushed back at
the borders by the Tunisian security forces and thus prevented from lodging asylum claims in Tunisia
(Crépeau, 2013a).
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irregular migrants in Tunisia, as well as in other North African countries that became
part of the EU external border program (EC 2016), it was clear that their primary
objective was to prevent, at any cost, large numbers of irregular migrants from reaching
EU territory. In pursuing this objective, the EU did not consider adopting a human
rights-based approach, but, on the contrary, chose to rely on Tunisia’s anti-migration
measures that systemically violated human rights. It is possible to see how the EU gave
precedence to the prevention of irregular migration over human rights by examining its
priorities in negotiations conducted with Tunisia on migration issues. When, for
example, EU member states negotiated readmission agreements with Tunisia, they
ignored Tunisian’s violations of human rights and focused exclusively on convincing
Tunisia to accept back its citizens and third country citizens who irregularly crossed the
Mediterranean Sea. EU member states used the visa facilitation program for Tunisian
citizens as an incentive for Tunisia to readmit irregular migrants but not as an incentive
to convince Tunisia to improve its record on human rights.
By indirectly supporting human rights violations in Tunisia, the EU undermined its
declared commitment to provide protection for asylum seekers. Although most EU
member states have rights-based standards and procedures for evaluating asylum
claims within their jurisdictions, they nevertheless rely on third countries systemically
violating human rights in order to prevent irregular migrants from reaching EU territory
and making asylum claims in one of the EU member states (Frelick et al. 2016). By
outsourcing migration controls to Tunisia, where asylum seekers are regularly subjected
to violations of their fundamental rights, the EU avoided its international obligations
towards asylum seekers coming from/through Tunisia.
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